Modi Pezeshkian Call Explained: India’s 3 Asks on Iran, Hormuz & Indian Nationals

Modi’s post on X after the call outlined exactly what India placed before Tehran. These were not vague diplomatic pleasantries — they were three precise asks with immediate operational consequences.

Ask 1 — Safety of Indian Nationals: India has approximately 9,000 nationals in Iran — students at Iranian universities, seafarers, business professionals, and Shia pilgrims at holy sites. The Indian Embassy in Tehran had issued advisories on January 14 and February 23 urging departure. Many had left, but thousands remained. Modi raised their safety directly with Pezeshkian.

The Ministry of External Affairs confirmed the Embassy is facilitating movement through an overland corridor to Armenia and Azerbaijan, from where commercial flights to India are accessible — since direct airspace over Iran and the region is severely restricted.

Ask 2 — Unhindered Strait of Hormuz Transit: This was the most economically urgent demand. India imports approximately 85% of its crude oil and over 60% of its LPG — a significant portion transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Iran had been denying passage to Indian-flagged commercial tankers since the war began.

At the time of the call: 24 Indian-flagged vessels carrying 677 seafarers were stranded west of the Strait; 4 vessels carrying 101 seafarers were stuck east of the Strait; and one Indian bulk oil carrier had been directly fired upon by Iranian naval forces. EAM Jaishankar had held three conversations with Iranian FM Abbas Araghchi — but a PM-level call was needed to formalise India’s position at the highest level.

Ask 3 — Dialogue and Diplomacy: Modi reiterated India’s commitment to peace and called for de-escalation through diplomatic means. This language is consistent with India’s position since hostilities began — neither condemning Iran nor endorsing the US-Israel offensive, but firmly calling for restraint.

The call came nearly two weeks after the war began — a deliberate sequencing, not a delay. Indian diplomatic practice follows a tiered escalation: foreign minister level first, then prime ministerial engagement when a higher-level commitment is required.

In the first week, India focused on evacuation logistics and the docking of the Iranian warship IRIS Lavan at Kochi on humanitarian grounds. EAM Jaishankar conducted three rounds of talks with Iranian FM Araghchi. But the threshold event — the firing on an Indian bulk carrier — made FM-level assurances insufficient. A head-of-government call was necessary to secure a commitment with prime ministerial authority behind it.

The 13-day gap also reflects India’s assessment of its leverage: India waited until it had a clear sense of what it needed and what credibility it brought to the conversation before escalating to the Modi–Pezeshkian level.

To understand why this call matters beyond the immediate crisis, the broader India–Iran relationship requires context.

Treaty of Friendship (1950): India and Iran formalised their modern bilateral relationship through a treaty signed on March 15, 1950 — one of India’s earliest post-independence diplomatic agreements.

Key diplomatic milestones: The relationship deepened through the 2001 Tehran Declaration (PM Vajpayee’s visit to Iran), the 2003 New Delhi Declaration (President Khatami’s visit to India), and PM Modi’s visit to Tehran in May 2016, when the two governments signed twelve agreements.

Modi–Pezeshkian first meeting: The two leaders met in person for the first time at the 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, in October 2024 — when Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Ethiopia, and Egypt formally joined BRICS as full members. That personal connection made the March 12 phone call possible.

Indian diaspora in the Gulf: Approximately one crore (10 million) Indians live across the Gulf and West Asia — the world’s largest overseas Indian concentration in a single region. Of these, roughly 40,000 are in Israel and 9,000 in Iran. The Gulf diaspora sends approximately $40 billion in remittances to India annually.

Chabahar Port is India’s most strategically significant infrastructure investment in Iran. Located in Sistan-Baluchestan province on the Gulf of Oman — outside the Strait of Hormuz — India operates the Shahid Beheshti Terminal through India Ports Global Limited (IPGL).

In May 2016, India, Iran, and Afghanistan signed a trilateral connectivity agreement positioning Chabahar as India’s gateway to Central Asia — bypassing Pakistan entirely. Chabahar has operated under a US sanctions exemption (humanitarian carve-out for connectivity), allowing India to continue development even during periods of US-Iran tension.

INSTC (International North-South Transport Corridor) is a 7,200-kilometre multi-modal freight route connecting Mumbai to St. Petersburg via Iran, Azerbaijan, and the Caspian Sea. India signed the founding agreement — the St. Petersburg Agreement — in 2002. Key corridor nodes: Chabahar → Bandar Abbas → Astara (Azerbaijan) → Baku → Caspian crossing → Russian rail network.

The Iran war directly threatens this corridor. Iranian ports are under attack, rail infrastructure has been damaged, and the overland route through Iran to Central Asia is disrupted — threatening years of Indian investment in alternative connectivity to Russia and Central Asia.

The Modi–Pezeshkian call is a real-time case study in India’s approach to great-power conflict — what EAM Jaishankar calls “strategic autonomy” and analysts describe as “multi-alignment.”

India has not condemned the US-Israel offensive on Iran. It has not endorsed it. It has not taken a position at the UN Security Council beyond calling for de-escalation. Simultaneously, it allowed an Iranian warship to dock at Kochi on humanitarian grounds (IRIS Lavan) while maintaining close cooperation with the United States on trade and the 30-day Russian oil waiver.

In calling Pezeshkian, Modi signals that India’s relationship with Iran is not collateral damage from its ties with the United States — and vice versa. The three asks are all framed in India-specific terms: Indian nationals, Indian ships, Indian energy security. There is no solidarity with Iran’s war position. No criticism of the US-Israel campaign. India asks only for what India needs — and offers nothing that would compromise its other relationships.

This is strategic autonomy in operational practice.

MEA (Ministry of External Affairs): India’s foreign affairs ministry, led by EAM S. Jaishankar. Spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal holds weekly press briefings — the primary official channel for India’s foreign policy positions. MEA confirmed both the evacuation logistics and the stabilisation of Hormuz transit for Indian tankers.

BRICS: Originally Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa. Expanded at the 2023 Johannesburg Summit to include Saudi Arabia, UAE, Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, and Argentina (Argentina subsequently declined). The 16th BRICS Summit was held in Kazan, Russia, October 2024 — where Modi and Pezeshkian met for the first time.

Strait of Hormuz: The 33-kilometre-wide strait between Iran (north) and Oman (south), connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. Approximately 20% of global oil and LNG passes through it daily. Closing Hormuz — even partially — is Iran’s most powerful asymmetric leverage tool in any conflict.

India’s energy dependence: India is the world’s third-largest crude oil consumer, importing approximately 85% of its needs. The Persian Gulf accounts for roughly 58% of India’s crude imports and 57% of gas imports. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar are the dominant suppliers — Iran was a major supplier before 2018 US sanctions forced India to wind down purchases.