India Hormuz Safe Passage 2026: How Shivalik & Nanda Devi Got Through

The Strait of Hormuz — a 33-kilometre-wide waterway between Iran to the north and Oman to the south — is the exit point for virtually all energy exports from the Persian Gulf. In normal times, roughly 20 per cent of global oil and LNG passes through the strait daily — approximately 20 million barrels of oil equivalent. For India specifically, the numbers are far more acute:

• 40 per cent of India’s crude oil imports transit the Strait of Hormuz
• 90 per cent of India’s LPG imports transit the Strait of Hormuz

India is the world’s third-largest consumer of crude oil and its second-largest consumer of LPG. LPG imports have tripled between 2011–12 and 2024–25, reaching approximately 20 million tonnes annually. Import dependency has grown from 47 per cent in 2015 to approximately 60 per cent by 2026. India has approximately 33 crore domestic LPG connections — including around 10 crore added under the Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana (PMUY) — making LPG access a direct welfare concern for hundreds of millions of households.

When Iran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz on February 28, the consequences for India were immediate and cascading. Commercial cylinder prices rose by ₹114.50 on March 9 alone. Black market prices for domestic cylinders reached ₹2,000 against the official price of ₹910. Induction cooktops went out of stock across major e-commerce platforms. Mumbai reported 8,000 hotels affected, with 20 per cent having closed. Bengaluru faced potential power cuts as an LPG-dependent power plant approached shutdown.

The government’s response operated on three tracks simultaneously. The Essential Commodities Act, 1955 was invoked on March 9, specifically for LPG, to control distribution and prevent hoarding. Refineries were directed to redirect propane and butane from petrochemical production to LPG. The inter-booking period was extended from 21 to 25 days as an anti-hoarding measure. A three-member high-level committee — led by Home Minister Amit Shah and including Jaishankar and Petroleum Minister Hardeep Singh Puri — was constituted to review India’s energy supply situation. But all of these were demand-management measures. The underlying problem was supply, and supply required getting ships through Hormuz.

Iran has not declared a blanket closure of the Strait of Hormuz. What it has established is a tiered approval system — which explains precisely why India’s diplomatic efforts had a realistic chance of success.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on March 5, 2026 declared that the strait is closed to vessels linked to the United States, Israel, and European states supporting the US-Israel offensive. IRGC Navy Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri stated: “Any vessel intending to pass must obtain permission from Iran.” Two vessels — the Express Rome and the Thailand-flagged Mayuree Naree — attempted to cross without authorisation and were seized. The Mayuree Naree caught fire following a strike; its crew was evacuated and brought safely to Khasab.

On March 10, Iran modified its order — announcing that countries which expelled Israeli and American ambassadors would receive “unrestricted passage.” This introduced a political conditionality that most countries were unwilling to meet. India met neither stated condition. What India had, instead, was a relationship. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Majid Takht-Ravanchi confirmed that Tehran had permitted ships from countries it deemed non-hostile to transit the strait. India fell into this category — not by meeting a formal condition, but by the accumulated weight of its bilateral relationship with Iran, its consistent non-alignment in the conflict, and its active diplomatic engagement.

The Hormuz breakthrough was not a single event. It was the product of a deliberate, sequenced diplomatic campaign conducted over approximately ten days.

Step 1 — The Jaishankar–Araghchi Track (March 2–12): EAM Jaishankar held three separate telephone conversations with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Each conversation built on the previous one — moving from general expressions of concern, to specific discussions of shipping safety, to explicit talks on energy security and transit arrangements for Indian vessels. MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal confirmed that following these conversations, “stabilisation in the transit of Indian oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz was secured” — though official India was careful not to announce a formal agreement, aware that Iranian sources were simultaneously denying any blanket arrangement.

Step 2 — The Modi–Pezeshkian Call (March 12): PM Modi’s direct call to President Pezeshkian on the night of March 12 — the first head-of-government contact between India and Iran since the war began — escalated the diplomatic channel to its highest level. One of Modi’s three explicit asks was “unhindered transit of goods and energy.” The call formalised at the prime ministerial level what the foreign minister track had been negotiating at the working level. It also gave Iran’s president a direct Indian interlocutor to whom a concession could be granted — rather than a bureaucratic channel that Tehran could claim it had never officially committed to.

Step 3 — The Ambassador’s Confirmation (March 13): Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Fathali’s public statement in New Delhi — “Yes, because India is our friend” — served multiple purposes simultaneously. For India’s domestic audience, it was proof that the diplomatic effort had worked. For Iran, it was a signal to other “friendly” nations that cooperation with Tehran would be rewarded. For global energy markets, it was a partial de-escalation signal demonstrating that Hormuz was not unconditionally closed to all traffic.

India’s Hormuz exemption is diplomatically significant not just for what it delivers to India, but for what it reveals about the war’s broader structure. Iran is using Hormuz access as a geopolitical sorting mechanism — distinguishing between hostile countries (US, Israel, EU members) and neutral or friendly nations (India, China, several African and Asian nations). This is consistent with Iran’s historical approach to coercive diplomacy: maximum pressure on adversaries while maintaining economic relationships with non-adversaries.

For India, the exemption validates a strategic calculation maintained for decades: that genuine relationships with multiple great powers and regional actors — rather than alignment with any single bloc — creates leverage that aligned states cannot access. No NATO member received what India received. The non-aligned posture, often criticised as fence-sitting, produced a concrete material outcome.

It also demonstrates the cumulative value of India’s Iran investments — Chabahar Port development, the INSTC (International North-South Transport Corridor) participation, the rupee-rial trade arrangements, and consistent diplomatic engagement at multiple levels — which gave India a reservoir of goodwill to draw upon precisely when it needed it most.

The limits must also be noted honestly. The exemption is informal and revocable. An Iranian drone strike in Oman on March 13 killed two Indian nationals — a reminder that India’s “friend” status does not insulate it from the conflict’s collateral effects. Five Indian nationals have now been killed in the broader conflict zone. The war is ongoing and the situation remains volatile.

Bandar Abbas: Iran’s largest commercial port, located on the northern shore of the Strait of Hormuz in Hormozgan Province. It is Iran’s primary port for container traffic and a major hub for oil exports. The MV Shivalik departed from Bandar Abbas — not from a Persian Gulf port further north. This is a frequently tested geography detail.

IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps): Iran’s ideological military force, separate from the conventional Iranian Army. The IRGC Navy controls maritime operations in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. The IRGC has been designated as a terrorist organisation by the United States (since 2019) — but not by India. This distinction matters for India’s legal and diplomatic positioning.

Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana (PMUY): Launched in May 2016, PMUY provides deposit-free LPG connections to women from below-poverty-line households. It has added approximately 10 crore connections — but the total domestic LPG connections in India are approximately 33 crore. Do not conflate the two figures. PMUY’s expansion is the structural reason India’s LPG import dependency grew — demand increased faster than domestic supply could match.

Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs): India’s three public-sector fuel retailers handle LPG distribution — Indian Oil Corporation (IOCL) under the brand Indane; Hindustan Petroleum Corporation (HPCL) under HP Gas; and Bharat Petroleum Corporation (BPCL) under Bharat Gas.