11th NPT Review Conference 2026 Fails: Causes, Impact & Key Facts

The four-week conference brought together representatives of nearly all 191 States Parties to the NPT. It was chaired by Ambassador Do Hung Viet, Permanent Representative of Vietnam to the United Nations. The closing press conference was held at 9 pm on 22 May alongside Izumi Nakamitsu, the UN’s High Representative for Disarmament Affairs.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres expressed deep disappointment, stating that “a vital opportunity to help strengthen global security and make the world a safer place has been lost.” The failure continues a grim pattern — the 2015 Conference collapsed over a Middle East nuclear-weapons-free zone, and the 2022 (10th) Conference was blocked by Russia over references to the war in Ukraine.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was opened for signature on 1 July 1968 and entered into force on 5 March 1970. With 191 States Parties, it is the most widely subscribed arms control treaty in history. The treaty rests on three interlocking pillars:

• Non-proliferation: Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) commit to never acquiring nuclear arms. The five Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) — the P5 (USA, Russia, China, UK, France) — are recognised as legitimate nuclear powers as they detonated a nuclear device before 1 January 1967.
• Disarmament: Under Article VI, all States Parties — including NWS — must pursue good-faith negotiations towards nuclear disarmament.
• Peaceful Uses: All compliant signatories have an inalienable right to nuclear technology for civilian purposes — electricity, medical diagnostics, and agriculture.

The IAEA serves as the treaty’s verification arm, conducting mandatory on-site inspections of NNWS nuclear facilities to ensure civil nuclear material is not diverted for weaponisation.

The breakdown was the product of several compounding disputes:

• Article VI deadlock: All five P5 states are currently modernising and expanding their arsenals — the opposite of what Article VI requires. The P5 blocked explicit disarmament timelines from draft declarations.
• New START expiry: The last legally binding US–Russia arms control treaty expired in February 2026 with no replacement, removing caps on deployed strategic warheads (previously 1,550 each). The US and Russia together hold ~90% of all nuclear weapons.
• China’s expansion: SIPRI estimated China held at least 600 warheads by January 2025, growing at ~100/year, with ~350 new ICBM silos under construction.
• Ukraine conflict spillover: Russia’s war in Ukraine, attacks on nuclear infrastructure, and forward deployment of tactical warheads in Belarus inflamed negotiations.
• Iran and Middle East: US and Israeli military strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards (June 2025, early 2026) created heated debate.
• TPNW exclusion: Nuclear-armed states blocked even a factual reference to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in the draft document.

According to SIPRI (January 2025), the nine nuclear-armed states collectively possessed an estimated 12,241 nuclear warheads. Of these, ~9,614 were in military stockpiles, ~3,912 were deployed, and ~2,100 were on high operational alert — almost all belonging to the US or Russia.

Four nuclear-armed states remain outside the NPT framework: India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea (withdrew 2003). Their combined arsenals of over 480 warheads operate without NPT review or IAEA safeguards obligations — creating a structural asymmetry where NNWS inside the treaty face mandatory inspections while substantial regional nuclear forces operate in a verification vacuum.

Other structural concerns at the 2026 conference included the expansion of nuclear extended deterrence arrangements in NATO Europe, the US redeployment of upgraded B61 tactical nuclear gravity bombs to European bases in early 2025, and the rise of hypersonic dual-capable missiles — which can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads — for which no dedicated verification framework exists.

India is not a signatory to the NPT and consistently characterises the treaty as discriminatory — arguing it creates a permanent two-tier international order by legitimising the P5’s arsenals while denying the same right to others. India’s nuclear doctrine rests on No-First-Use (NFU) and minimum credible deterrence.

However, India is a signatory to the CTBT on a voluntary basis and participates in non-proliferation export control regimes. India’s nuclear programme is partially subject to IAEA safeguards under bilateral agreements with the Agency — but it is not subject to NPT review processes.

Key reform proposals debated at the conference:

• Mandatory P5 disarmament timelines: Converting Article VI from a vague obligation into verifiable, time-bound targets
• Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT): An international ban on producing highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons — stalled in the UN Conference on Disarmament for over two decades
• Hypersonic verification protocols: A UN-led framework to distinguish dual-capable hypersonic missiles from conventional weapons
• Bridging NPT and TPNW: Formal linkages between the two frameworks to reinforce nuclear weapons stigmatisation
• New Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs): Expanding NWFZs to West Asia and Northeast Asia

Five NWFZs currently exist: Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba), Latin America & Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), Southeast Asia (Treaty of Bangkok), Central Asia (Treaty of Semipalatinsk), and South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga).