Pakistan Afghanistan Open War 2026: Kabul Bombed, Durand Line, TTP & India’s Role

Pakistan and Afghanistan share a 2,670 km border — one of the most troubled frontiers in the world. The Durand Line, drawn by the British in 1893 as the boundary between British India and Afghanistan, has never been formally accepted by any Afghan government. Afghanistan’s claim to Pashtun-majority territories straddling the border has been a source of hostility between the two countries since Pakistan’s independence in 1947.

The situation became dramatically more complicated after the US-led NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 and the Taliban’s return to power in Kabul. Pakistan had historically supported the Taliban during the US presence, seeing it as a strategic asset. But with the Taliban back in power, relations quickly deteriorated over one core issue: Pakistan accuses the Afghan Taliban of harbouring the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) — also called the Pakistani Taliban — which has been conducting an escalating campaign of attacks inside Pakistan. The Taliban government in Kabul denies this. Pakistan’s military establishment finds this deeply unconvincing.

Both sides are fighting an aggressive information war, making independent verification difficult.

Pakistan claims: 274 Taliban fighters killed, 83 posts destroyed, 17 captured, 27+ pieces of heavy equipment (tanks, artillery, APCs) destroyed. 12 Pakistani soldiers killed, 27 wounded, 1 missing.

Afghanistan claims: 55 Pakistani soldiers killed (bodies of 23 taken to Afghanistan), several captured alive, 19 posts and 2 bases destroyed. 8 Afghan soldiers killed, 11 wounded.

Neither set of figures has been independently verified. UNAMA (UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) has confirmed civilian casualties from Pakistani strikes — 13+ deaths in Paktika province — lending some independent weight to Afghan civilian harm claims. Both sides have strong incentives to inflate enemy losses and minimise their own.

In the midst of declaring “open war,” Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif made a significant accusation: he charged that the Taliban had turned Afghanistan “into a colony of India” — referencing India’s improving ties with the Taliban government since 2021. From Pakistan’s perspective, any improvement in India-Afghanistan relations is a strategic threat on its western flank — the spectre of being squeezed between a hostile India to the east and an India-aligned Afghanistan to the west.

India’s official response was firm. MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal issued a strong condemnation of Pakistan’s airstrikes and expressed support for Afghanistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity — effectively siding with the Taliban-led government against Pakistani military action.

This is strategically calculated: India’s interest lies in preventing Pakistan from having a compliant, subordinate neighbour to its west. A Taliban-led Afghanistan that maintains independence from Pakistan is strategically preferable for India — even if it means backing a government India otherwise has deep ideological differences with. For India, enemy of enemy logic applies here.

China expressed being “deeply concerned over the escalation” — carefully worded to avoid blaming either party. China has strong relationships with both Pakistan (its “all-weather strategic partner”) and the Taliban (Beijing has sought to engage Kabul for Belt and Road connectivity). Its neutrality reflects genuine stake in both sides.

Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan held separate calls with his Pakistani, Afghan, Qatari, and Saudi counterparts on February 27, offering Turkish mediation — a role Turkey has played in multiple Muslim-majority conflicts.

Iran’s Foreign Minister urged both sides to “step back from confrontation and return to talks,” framing Ramadan as an opportunity for restraint.

Russia and Saudi Arabia also joined mediation outreach. Former US Ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad called for a diplomatic agreement monitored by a trusted third party like Turkey — under which neither country would allow its territory to be used against the other. This proposal echoes the framework of the 2020 Doha Agreement.

The Doha Agreement Problem. Pakistan has called on the international community to pressure the Taliban to honour their commitments under the 2020 Doha Agreement — negotiated between the US and the Taliban before the NATO withdrawal — under which the Taliban pledged not to allow Afghan soil to be used against other countries. Pakistan argues the Taliban has violated this commitment by allowing TTP operations. The Taliban disputes this, arguing the TTP is a Pakistani domestic problem.

Nuclear Dimension. Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state. A destabilised Pakistan — with its military engaged in active conflict on its western border while maintaining its eastern posture against India — raises serious questions about the stability of Pakistan’s nuclear command structure during a period of unprecedented military pressure on two fronts. Afghanistan has no nuclear weapons.

The FATA/KP Factor. Pakistan’s northwestern frontier — the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), now merged into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) — has been the epicentre of TTP violence. The region’s Pashtun population has cultural and tribal links across the Durand Line. Any major military operation risks civilian casualties and domestic political blowback within Pakistan itself.