“India remains the world’s second-largest arms importer — but the who and why are changing faster than the rank itself.” — SIPRI Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025
On March 9, 2026, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) released its annual report Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025 — the definitive global accounting of who buys major weapons from whom. The report covers the five-year period 2021–2025, measuring volumes of transfers using SIPRI’s standardised Trend Indicator Value (TIV) methodology — not monetary values.
The headline for India: the country remains the world’s second-largest arms importer, accounting for 8.2% of global arms imports in 2021–25. But beneath that headline lies a structural shift in suppliers — from Russia to France and Israel — that is as consequential as the ranking itself, and directly tied to India’s Atmanirbhar Bharat defence push and its strategic competition with China and Pakistan.
🌍 The Global Picture: Ukraine at the Top, Europe Surging
Ukraine has emerged as the world’s largest arms importer for 2021–25, accounting for 9.7% of global imports — a staggering shift driven entirely by the Russian invasion that began in February 2022. Ukraine’s arms imports increased nearly 100-fold compared to 2015–19, with the United States, Germany, and Poland as its primary suppliers.
Europe as a region has more than tripled its arms imports between 2016–20 and 2021–25 — the most dramatic regional shift in the data. The Ukraine war catalysed a continent-wide rearmament drive across all categories: combat aircraft, air defence systems, armoured vehicles, and munitions. This European surge is the primary driver of the 9.2% increase in global arms transfers between the two five-year periods.
China produced the most striking exit in the data. For the first time since 1991–95, China is no longer in the top 10 arms importers. China’s domestic defence industry has matured to the point where it can produce most systems it requires — combat aircraft, warships, armoured vehicles, missiles — without significant foreign procurement. Simultaneously, China has become the world’s fourth-largest arms exporter, though overtaken by Germany in 2021–25.
The global top importers by rank: 1st Ukraine (9.7%), 2nd India (8.2%), 3rd Saudi Arabia, 4th Qatar, 5th Pakistan (4.2%).
China dropped from the top 10 IMPORTERS — but it is still a major EXPORTER (4th globally). Do not confuse China’s exit from the import list with any reduction in its defence industrial power. The opposite is true: China exited the import list because its domestic industry is now strong enough to produce what it previously had to buy.
📌 India: Second Place, Shrinking Share, Shifting Suppliers
India’s 8.2% share in 2021–25 is lower than the 9.3% it held in 2016–20, and total Indian arms imports fell by 4% between the two periods. SIPRI attributes part of this decline to India’s Atmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliant India) defence push, which has begun displacing some foreign procurement with domestic production.
However, SIPRI notes that “indigenous programmes often face production delays” — meaning the decline in imports is partly a function of domestic industry not yet being ready to deliver at scale, not purely successful import substitution. Large planned procurements — up to 140 combat aircraft from France and six conventional submarines from Germany — could reverse the import decline if finalised.
Think of India’s import decline as a factory mid-renovation. India is trying to build weapons at home (Atmanirbhar Bharat), so it is buying less abroad. But the new factories are not fully running yet. So the imports have dipped — not because India is fully self-reliant, but because it is caught between the old supply and the new one not yet ready. The next big aircraft and submarine deals could restart the import clock.
📜 Russia’s Declining Share: The Most Important Trend
India’s relationship with Russia has long defined its arms import profile — but that relationship is contracting at an accelerating pace:
- 2011–15: Russia supplied 70% of India’s arms
- 2016–20: Russia’s share fell to 51%
- 2021–25: Russia now supplies just 40% — the lowest share in decades
Multiple factors drive this decline. Russia’s defence industrial capacity has been severely strained by the Ukraine war — it is consuming its own weapons output and drawing down stockpiles faster than it can produce, leaving fewer systems available for export. Post-2022 Western sanctions have complicated payments, logistics, and spare parts supply chains. India has also deliberately pursued diversification to reduce single-supplier dependence — particularly after experiencing spare parts disruptions in earlier periods.
Russia is STILL India’s top arms supplier at 40% — France is second at 29%, Israel third at 15%. The trend is declining, but Russia remains number one for 2021–25. A common exam error is to assume France has overtaken Russia.
✨ France at 29%, Israel at 15%: The New Suppliers
France (29%) has emerged as India’s second-largest arms supplier, driven primarily by the Rafale combat aircraft. India purchased 36 Rafale jets from Dassault Aviation under a government-to-government deal signed in 2016, with all deliveries completed by 2022. The Indian Navy has since agreed to purchase 26 Rafale Marine (carrier-based variant) aircraft. SIPRI notes that India has placed orders for up to 140 additional combat aircraft from France — a procurement that, if finalised, would make France India’s dominant supplier for the foreseeable future.
Israel (15%) has grown into India’s third-largest arms supplier. Key Israeli systems supplied to India include the Barak-8 medium-range surface-to-air missile (developed jointly under the Long Range Surface to Air Missile / LR-SAM programme), loitering munitions, unmanned aerial systems (UAVs), and electronic warfare equipment. India-Israel defence relations have deepened significantly since the 1990s.
| Supplier | 2011–15 Share | 2016–20 Share | 2021–25 Share |
|---|---|---|---|
| Russia | 70% | 51% | 40% ↓ |
| France | Low | Rising | 29% ↑ |
| Israel | Low | Growing | 15% ↑ |
⚖️ The India–Pakistan–China Triangle
Pakistan — 5th largest importer, 66% surge: Pakistan’s arms imports grew by 66% between 2016–20 and 2021–25, lifting it to fifth place globally with a 4.2% share. The driver is unambiguous: China supplied 80% of Pakistan’s arms during 2021–25, up from 73% in 2016–20. China has become Pakistan’s near-exclusive arms patron — providing the JF-17 Thunder combat aircraft (co-developed), Type 054A/P frigates, HQ-9 air defence systems, and a range of missiles and armoured vehicles. Turkey and the Netherlands are distant second and third suppliers.
SIPRI explicitly states that “India’s tensions with China and Pakistan largely drive its arms imports” — and that both India and Pakistan used imported weapons in their brief armed confrontation in May 2025.
China — exiting the import list: China’s exit from the top 10 importers is a landmark in global defence industrial development. At its peak, China was among the world’s largest arms importers — primarily from Russia (Su-27/30 fighters, Kilo-class submarines, S-300 air defence systems). China has since developed domestic equivalents of all these: the J-11/16, Type 039 submarine, and HQ-9. This closure of the import chapter marks China’s arrival as a mature defence industrial power.
China supplies 80% of Pakistan’s arms while India sources only 40% from Russia. What does it mean strategically when one side in a rivalry has a single dominant arms patron, while the other is actively diversifying? Does concentration create vulnerability — or does it create reliability? How does this shape deterrence dynamics in South Asia?
🌍 The Global Exporter Landscape
United States — 42% of global exports: The US has extended its dominance as the world’s arms supplier, up from 36% in 2016–20. Washington exported to 99 states during 2021–25 — covering every region of the world. The US accounts for 45% of all global exports of long-range land-attack missiles. In Asia and Oceania, the US supplied 35% of total regional imports.
France — 2nd at 9.8%: French exports increased 11% from 2016–20, driven primarily by Rafale sales to Egypt, Qatar, Greece, Croatia, Indonesia, and India. France’s pending order book remains strong.
Russia — 3rd, down sharply: Russia’s export share has collapsed from close to 25% at its 2011–15 peak to a significantly diminished third place in 2021–25. India (40%), China (17%), and Kazakhstan (11%) remain Russia’s top buyers — but all three are reducing their shares.
Germany — 4th, overtaking China: Germany’s arms exports grew by 28% between periods, lifting it above China into fourth place globally. German exports are dominated by submarines, frigates, and armoured vehicles — with Greece, South Korea, and Norway as major customers. Germany’s potential sale of six conventional submarines to India could further boost its ranking.
| Rank | Exporter | Global Share (2021–25) | Key Buyers |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1st | USA | 42% | 99 states — every region |
| 2nd | France | 9.8% | India, Egypt, Qatar, Greece |
| 3rd | Russia | Declining sharply | India (40%), China (17%), Kazakhstan |
| 4th | Germany | +28% growth | Greece, South Korea, Norway |
| 5th | Italy | — | — |
📖 About SIPRI: Exam Facts
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is an independent international think tank based in Solna, Sweden (near Stockholm — but not in Stockholm city proper). Founded in 1966, it is the global reference standard for data on conflict, armaments, arms transfers, and disarmament.
SIPRI publishes three flagship annual reports: the SIPRI Yearbook (comprehensive review of armaments and security), Trends in International Arms Transfers (released each March), and the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (tracks national defence budgets).
SIPRI’s Trend Indicator Value (TIV) methodology measures the volume of arms transfers using a standardised unit based on known unit production costs of reference weapons. It is not a measure of financial value — SIPRI TIV figures are not comparable to contract prices, rupee budgets, or dollar deal values.
SIPRI is in Solna — not Stockholm city proper. It is often described as “Stockholm-based” (which is broadly correct as Solna is part of the Stockholm urban area), but the precise answer for MCQs is Solna, Sweden. Also: SIPRI TIV ≠ contract price or rupee/dollar value. SIPRI measures volume of weapons transferred, not the money paid.
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India is ranked 2nd largest arms importer in SIPRI 2025, accounting for 8.2% of global imports. Ukraine is 1st at 9.7%.
Russia supplied 40% of India’s arms imports in 2021–25 — down from 70% in 2011–15 and 51% in 2016–20. Russia remains the top supplier despite the steep decline.
Pakistan’s arms imports surged 66% between 2016–20 and 2021–25, lifting it to 5th globally. China supplied 80% of Pakistan’s imports during this period.
SIPRI was founded in 1966 and is located in Solna, Sweden — not Stockholm city proper, though it is often described as “Stockholm-based” since Solna is part of the greater Stockholm area.
China exited the top 10 importers list for the first time since 1991–95 — because its domestic defence industry can now independently produce most major weapons systems it previously had to import.